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COMEDY OR TRAGEDY: THE TALE OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION REMOVAL
AND THE ONE-YEAR BAR
Michael W. Lewis*

Thus at oral argument we had the privilege of witnessing a comic
scene: plaintiffs personal injury lawyer protests up and down that his
client's injuries are as minor and insignificant as can be, while attorneys for the manufacturerpaint a sob story about how plaintiff's life
has been wrecked.'
HIS is not the only theatrical performance that has been driven by
the one-year bar on diversity removal. Another darker and more
cynical drama has also been playing to more intimate audiences.
This from a performance in Virginia:
Opening scene: A scheduling conference in a civil matter between two
lawyers with the state court judge's secretary. Calendars are compared,
dates are proposed for a scheduling order, and the judge's secretary
leaves the lawyers alone for a couple of minutes while cross-checking
other docket entries and court calendars.
Defense attorney: "You've sued for $74,900 on a products liability theory. Let's ignore the potential Workers' Comp bar for now. Before we
go too deep into discovery, any possibility of discussing settlement?"
Plaintiff's attorney: "No. This is a $3 million case. He's got over
$300,000 in meds alone."
Defense attorney: "So why are you suing for $74,000? Sure it is under
the jurisdictional amount for removal now, but you're obviously not going to stay there."
Plaintiff's attorney: "I only have to stay there for a year. I'll amend my
ad damnum after one year has passed to our $3 million claim, and that
way you can't remove us to federal court because of the one year bar.
And you can't just confess judgment and tender the $74,900, because I
* Assistant Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law.
This Article evolved from my experiences in practice. I would like to thank Professor John
B. Oakley of the University of California-Davis School of Law, Professor Alexandra Lahav
of the University of Connecticut School of Law and the participants in the Ohio Junior
Legal Scholars Workshop for their review and comments on this Article. I would also like
to thank my research assistant Nathan Hosek, for his substantial contributions to this work
and our research librarian David Fetrow for his statistical support.
1. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J.).
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have allegations of punitive damages that would be deemed as admitted
for any future claims involving the same product."
2
Defense attorney (to himself): "Can he do that?"
The rather unsatisfactory answer to that question is "it depends." It
depends upon which circuit you are in, and possibly which district within
a circuit you are in, and the standards which that jurisdiction currently
applies to determine whether a removal motion meets the burden of
proof relative to the amount in controversy.
Both of these performances were created in reaction to the one-year
bar on removal. This Article seeks to introduce this problem to a wider
audience, discuss its many manifestations, review the existing solutions
that have been proposed, and to add one of its own to the discussion.
Both the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference of the United States
have advanced proposals for a legislative solution to the difficulties created by the one-year bar. 3 But the reality is that a legislative solution is
unlikely. 4 Absent such action, this Article proposes a judicial solution
that will yield a consistent answer to this question, while minimizing the
incentives for gamesmanship such as that demonstrated above and upholding the legislative goal of restricting removals that underlies the oneyear bar.
Part I of the Article will briefly describe federal diversity jurisdiction
and the amount in controversy requirement. It will discuss the one-year
bar on removal in diversity cases that Congress introduced in 1988, along
with the purpose Congress attached to that change. It will also briefly
examine the conventional belief, shared by both the plaintiffs' and the
defense bar, that defendants fare better in federal court. Part 1I will discuss the various standards used by each circuit to determine whether the
amount in controversy requirement for removing a diversity case has
been met and how they have shifted over time. It will also describe the
variety of state law pleading requirements that cut across circuit bounda2. Although perhaps not word-for-word accurate, this conversation took place in the
judicial secretary's office in the Virginia Circuit Court, Norfolk Circuit, in 2005. For other
possible examples of amount in controversy manipulation. See, e.g. Omi's Custard Co. v.
Relish This, LLC, No. 04-CV-861-DRH, 2006 WL 2460573, at *1 (S.D. I11.Aug. 24, 2006)
(plaintiff secured remand on grounds that machine at issue only cost $39,800, then
amended its complaint after the one year deadline to claim $300,000 in consequential damages); see also Wise v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., No. Civ. JFM-02-2323, 2002 WL
2001529, at *1 (D. Md. 2002) (plaintiff's initial complaint for $75,000 was amended fourteen months later to demand $750,000 without alleging any new facts to support the increase in damages); see also Smith v. Bally's Holiday, 843 F. Supp. 1451, 1453-55 (N.D. Ga.
1994) (oral communication from plaintiff's counsel indicating damages "in the six figure
range" insufficient to support motion for removal).
3. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 2 (2004); Proposed Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2008
(on file with the author).
4. Interview with John B. Oakley, Reporter for the ALI Federal Judicial Code Revision Project. The ALl proposal calls for the elimination of the one-year bar, and the draft
legislative proposal from the Judicial Conference proposes the use of an equitable exception to the one-year bar to alleviate the problems discussed in this Article.
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ries and illustrate how these state law variations potentially alter the application of the one-year bar from state to state. Part III will briefly
discuss uniformity and the costs and benefits associated with attempting
to maintain uniformity throughout the federal systems. It will also explain why, even if you accept the premise that uniformity is generally
overvalued, the lack of uniformity in amount in controversy removal litigation is particularly damaging and must be remedied. Part IV will describe the legislative change proposed by the ALI in its 2004 Federal
Code Revision Project and the proposal recently put forward by the
Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, and how each addresses the one-year bar. It will also consider proposals made by the courts for preventing amount in controversy
manipulation, including the use of equitable exceptions to the one-year
bar. Part V will outline my proposal for applying the one-year bar to
amount in controversy issues in a manner that preserves the congressional intent to limit federal jurisdiction while preventing improper manipulation of that provision.
I.

REMOVAL'S RULES AND PERCEPTIONS
A.

FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

Federal diversity jurisdiction is specifically provided for by Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Judicial Power
shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different
States."'5 James Madison explained to the Virginia ratifying convention
that this measure was included in the Constitution because:
It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise, in some states,
against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them. We
know what tardy, and even defective, administration of justice has
happened in some states. A citizen of another state might not chance
in a state court, and at all events he might think himself
to get justice
6
injured.
Having been provided for in the Constitution, the boundaries of federal jurisdiction were first set by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and have been
routinely altered by Congress ever since. 7 These boundaries have been
adjusted through changes in the amount in controversy requirement and
through the addition of other restrictions on the scope of federal
jurisdiction.
Federal diversity jurisdiction requires not only complete diversity between plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) but also a showing that the "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs." Plaintiffs originally filing in federal court may meet
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 2d ed. 1896).
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).

8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
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the amount in controversy requirement by making a good faith claim in
excess of that amount. 9 The purpose of the amount in controversy requirement is the underlying belief that only cases of a certain magnitude
merit federal court attention. It is generally accepted that the primary
rationale for diversity jurisdiction was "to protect nonresidents from the
local prejudices of state courts."1 0 Where the cost of this disadvantage is
minimal, the need for diversity jurisdiction is also minimal.
Increasing the amount in controversy has been a-favorite congressional
tool for restricting access to federal courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789
placed the amount in controversy requirement at $500.11 This was increased to $2,000 in 188712 and to $3,000 in 1911.13 A further increase to
$10,000 occurred in 1958,14 and as Congress added the one-year bar in
1988, it also raised the amount in controversy requirement to $50,000.15
The final increase to $75,000 occurred in 1996.16 These successive increases in the amount in controversy are mainly reflective of adjustments
for inflation but also indicate a belief that the threshold magnitude for
federal court cases has increased over the past fifty years.
The latest change in the amount in controversy requirement took place
in 2005 with the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 17
CAFA provided for the aggregation of class action claims to meet the
amount in controversy requirement for diverse class actions. It also set
the aggregated amount in controversy requirement at an aggregated
value in excess of $5 million. 18 Although this aggregated value is much
larger than the individual claim requirements of $75,000, by allowing aggregation of claims CAFA effectively expanded federal jurisdiction over
diverse class actions.
B.

REMOVAL RULES AND THE ONE-YEAR BAR

In general civil defendants may remove a case from state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction. 19 One
source of original federal jurisdiction are cases where complete diversity
of citizenship exists and "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
9. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
10. 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

§ 3721 (3d ed. 1998).
11. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552.
13. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091.
14. Act of Jul. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1332, 72 Stat. 415, 415-16.
15. See The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988).
16. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847,
3850 (1996); 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (2000).
17. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) & (6) (Supp. V. 2005). Prior to CAFA the amount in controversy could not be aggregated to meet the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for each individual claim.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
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value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.",20 The actual procedures
for removal and the limitations thereon are governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446.21
In 1988 Congress revised § 1446 and inserted a condition in the second
paragraph of § 1446(b) "that a case may not be removed on the basis of
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title [diversity jurisdiction]
more than 1 year after commencement of the action."'22 The stated purpose of this additional restriction was to "reduc[e] the opportunity for
removal after substantial progress has been made in state court. '23 As
the House Report indicates, Congress intended this amendment as a
"modest curtailment" of removals that otherwise might be allowed by
24
changes in parties that occur shortly before trial.
As written, this provision represents an absolute bar against any removal on diversity grounds after one year. The Commentary to § 1446
recognizes that this bar may invite plaintiffs to engage in "tactical chicanery" to avoid unwanted federal jurisdiction and addresses the most common manipulative method employed, the addition of diversity-destroying
defendants. 25 While pointing out that the inclusion of clearly improper
defendants may run afoul of the "fraudulent joinder" doctrine, the Commentary acknowledges that this doctrine is rarely effective for
defendants.
Neither the House Report nor the Commentary discusses the possibility of manipulating the amount in controversy to avoid federal jurisdiction.26 This is probably because that technique for forum manipulation
was actually made possible by the creation of the one-year bar. Prior to
the 1988 amendments, the only time restriction on the defendants right to
removal was
[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice
of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000).
22. Id. § 1446(b).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6031-6034; see
also 134 CONG. REC. H10430-01 (1988). The congressional record amplified this reasoning
by stating that Subsection (b)(2) amends 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to establish a one-year limit

on removal based on diversity jurisdiction as a means of reducing the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court. The result is a modest curtailment in access to diversity jurisdiction. The amendment addresses problems that arise
from a change of parties as an action progresses toward trial in state court. The elimination
of parties may create for the first time a party alignment that supports diversity jurisdiction. Under Section 1446(b), removal is possible whenever this event occurs, so long as the
change of parties was voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a diversity-destroying

defendant on the eve of trial, for example, may permit the remaining defendants to re-

move. Removal late in the proceedings may result in substantial delay and disruption.
H.R. REP. No. 100-889.
24. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 Commentary on 1988 Revision at 129 (Supp. 1990).
26. See id.
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ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable .... 27
Therefore any initial representation that the amount in controversy was
below the jurisdictional minimum had no effect on the defendant's ultimate ability to remove. It was only the addition of the one-year bar that
allowed a plaintiff's initial misrepresentation to ultimately affect federal
jurisdiction.
Based on the House Report two things seem clear. First, Congress intended to modestly curtail the availability of removal in diversity cases
even though such curtailment might be subject to abuse. Second, although Congress generally recognized that this amendment created a potential for abuse, it did not understand that the amendments were
creating an additional method for such abuse, namely amount in controversy manipulation.
C.

PERCEPTIONS OF REMOVAL'S IMPACT ON LITIGATION

One of the most hotly contested procedural issues in any litigation
where federal jurisdiction may be found is whether the case will be tried
in state or federal court. Empirical studies indicate that both the plaintiff
and defense sides of the bar generally believe that defendants derive a
significant advantage by removing a case to federal court. 28 Based on this
belief, the plaintiffs' bar has produced numerous articles on the best ways
to defeat federal jurisdiction. 29 Academic studies do seem to support this
shared belief that defendants enjoy some advantage in federal court, although the magnitude of the advantage may not be as great as perceived. 30 In addition to these broad summaries indicating that
defendants benefit from federal jurisdiction, there are also localized differences between state civil procedure and federal procedure that likely
encourage removal.
One example of state/federal procedural differences can be found in
Virginia, where state civil procedure does not allow for the use of deposi27. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
28. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 581, 581 (1998); see also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 417
(1992).
29. See, e.g., Allyson Singer Breeden, Federal Removal Jurisdiction and its Effect on
Plaintiff Win-Rates, 46 Ras GESTAE 26, 30-31 (2002) (Although Breeden opens her article
by citing raw win-rate data, thereby ignoring the caveats that Clermont and Eisenberg
place on drawing conclusions from such data, the article is indicative of many discussions
about the strategic value of state court versus federal jurisdiction.); Erik B. Walker, Keep
Your Case in State Court, 40-SEP JTLATRIAL 22, 22-29 (2004).
30. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 606-07 (affirming statistically that
removing defendants have greater win-rates in federal court than those involved in cases
originally filed by plaintiffs in federal court). But see Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt,
Brian Ostrom and David Rothman, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A
Statistical Portrait,19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1996) (indicating that plaintiff win
rates in state and federal court are relatively comparable).
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tion testimony to support motions for summary judgment. 31 This makes
that procedural device a rarity in state court. These restrictions on summary judgment evidence are not found in federal court, giving Virginia
state court defendants an additional incentive to seek federal jurisdiction.
II.
A.

CURRENT PROCEDURAL RULES
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY STANDARDS

The one aspect of amount in controversy disputes that is well settled is
the standard that is applied when defendants attempt to defeat federal
jurisdiction over diversity cases originally filed in federal court. Defendants must show that it is "a legal certainty that the claim is really for less
than the jurisdictional amount."' 32 This "legal certainty" test established
by the Supreme Court in Red Cab applies to diversity cases where the
plaintiff is seeking a federal forum. But this is only one of at least four
tests that are variously applied across the circuits when the amount in
controversy is disputed in the removal context.
Because it is widely believed that defendants benefit from a federal
forum, it is in the removal context that most disputes over the amount in
controversy arise. In these cases defendants remove the case to federal
court based, in part, on the claim that the case satisfies the amount in
controversy requirement. 33 Plaintiffs respond by moving to remand the
case to state court on the grounds that defendants have failed to establish
that the amount in controversy requirement has been met. 34 Plaintiffs
methods to avoid providing the evimay avail themselves of a variety of 35
dentiary support for this contention.
Courts have adopted at least four different standards to analyze disputes over whether the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied in
the removal context the "legal certainty" standard used by the Red Cab
court was briefly described above. 36 The other standards commonly used
are "preponderance of the evidence," "reasonable probability," and "inverted legal certainty," although each of these standards has also been
referred to by a variety of other names. Some circuits apply more than
one of these standards depending upon a variety of factors including the
type of claim involved and the form of the pleadings. Even in circuits
that recognize only one standard, a look at the district courts within the
circuit often reveals that several different standards are actually applied.
Nominally the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that
the removing party demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the
amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. There are a whole host of
31. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-420 (2007).
32. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab, 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
33. Breeden, supra note 29, at 30.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (instructing plaintiff's attorneys on how to avoid federal jurisdiction); see also Walker, supra note 29, at 26.
36. See text accompanying note 32.
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issues that this standard implicates. When should the amount in controversy be measured? 37 What qualifies as evidence of the amount in controversy? 38 What effect can a plaintiff's stipulations have upon the
amount in controversy? 39 Are defendants allowed to conduct discovery
on amount in controversy issues after filing a removal petition?4 0 Courts
are far from unified in their approach to answering many of these
questions.
The same holds true for courts applying the "reasonable probability" 4 1
or "some possibility" 42 standards. The little used "some possibility" standard represents a more relaxed standard than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard while the much more frequently used "reasonable
probability" standard is considered to be more demanding than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 43 For both standards the same
issues regarding evidence, stipulations, and discovery discussed above are
in play, and trial courts are required to provide a meaningful "reasonable
probability" analysis explaining the decision to grant or deny the motion
44
to remand.
In many instances, after a removing defendant satisfies the local standard for meeting the amount in controversy requirement, courts then allow plaintiffs to overturn that determination if they can meet the
"inverted legal certainty" standard. Under this test, the plaintiff (as the
non-moving party) is required to meet the Red Cab standard; that it is a
45
legal certainty that the amount in controversy will not be satisfied.

37. There is a clear circuit split on this issue. The majority rule states that the amount
in controversy must be determined at the time that suit is filed. Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Community Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1999). The
minority rule followed by the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit allows for events occurring after the suit is filed, such as the dismissal of certain counts of the complaint that
reduce its value below the jurisdictional minimum, to oust jurisdiction at the discretion of
the court. Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Still other courts have
chosen to consider the time that the removal petition is filed as the point at which the
amount in controversy must be considered; Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir.
1995). See, e.g., Leslie v. BancTec Serv. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 341, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) states that the basis for removal may be ascertained from "an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper" which has been taken by most courts to
include demand letters, settlement offers and other correspondence. See Vermande v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201 (D. Conn. 2004). But see King v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 213, 217 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 prohibits the use of settlement discussions to prove the amount in
controversy).
39. See infra Part II.H.
40. See infra Part II.M.
41. See, e.g., Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000).
42. See, e.g., Foret v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1990).
43. See, e.g., Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993).
44. See Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the
Second Circuit's reliance on the reasonable probability standard but remanding to the district court for an explanation of how the amount in controversy analysis was done).
45. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2007).
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B.

FIRST CIRCUIT

While the First Circuit follows the Red Cab "legal certainty" standard
in cases where the defendant is challenging federal jurisdiction on
amount in controversy grounds, 46 it is an open question as to which standard its courts would apply in deciding an amount in controversy dispute
in the removal context. 47 In the past six years both Radlo v. RhonePoulenc and Satterfield v. F.W. Webb, Inc., from the district courts of
Maine and Massachusetts respectively, indicated a willingness to utilize
either a "preponderance of the evidence" standard or a "legal certainty"
test. Neither court adopted a firm position on this open question because
they found that, in both cases, the defendants had not even met the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, thereby allowing these courts to
remand without deciding which standard should apply. In contrast, the
District of New Hampshire definitively applied the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard to removing defendants in amount in controversy
48
disputes.
Whether or not the districts within the First Circuit agree on whether
"preponderance of the evidence" is the standard, the approach that they
take when considering amount in controversy disputes where no specific
amount has been pled is relatively uniform. The question appears to be
"'whether to anyone familiar with the applicable law [the] claim could
'49
objectively have been viewed as worth' the jurisdictional minimum.
This "I know it when I see it" standard based upon a judicial analysis of
the face of the complaint has lead to judgment calls that have granted
motions to remand where pain and suffering was the principal source of
damages as well as denying remand in similar circumstancesi 0 This is not
to say that these judgments were wrong, just that they provide sufficient
uncertainty for both sides of the removal equation to nurture some hope
that their preferred result will prevail. Defendants in questionable removal cases are encouraged by this standard's uncertainty to attempt removal while plaintiffs are given an incentive to be even less specific in
their damages claims in order to support their motion for remand.
46. See Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335, 338 (1st Cir. 2004).
47. See, e.g., Satterfield v. F.W. Webb, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D. Me. 2004); Radio
v. Rhone-Poulenc, S.A., 241 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63-64 (D. Mass. 2002). Both cases indicate that
either the legal certainty standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard apply
and both remand to state court without a decision because defendants could not even meet
the preponderance of the evidence standard.
48. Evans v. Yum Brands, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 214, 219-20 (D.N.H. 2004) (citing
Tremblay v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 411, 414 n.2 (D.N.H. 2002)).
49. Id. at 221 (quoting Jimenez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.
1978)).
50. Compare Stewart, 356 F.3d at 340 (holding that mental anguish and loss of consortium worth more than $75,000 jurisdictional minimum), with Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods,
Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 129-31 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (finding that Ortega's emotional distress damages could not rise to the level of the jurisdictional minimum).
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SECOND CIRCUIT

It is unclear which standard the Second Circuit utilizes when determining whether removing defendants have satisfied the amount in controversy requirement. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard and
the "reasonable probability" standard are most commonly cited, although
at least one court has utilized the more relaxed "reasonable possibility"
test.51 While the "reasonable probability" standard is cited frequently
52
and courts often render their decisions with reference to this standard,
language conflating "reasonable probability" with "preponderance of the
evidence" occurs frequently in both district and circuit courts. 53 This conflation of standards might explain why as recently as 2003 one court concluded that "[tlhe standard governing a removing defendant's burden
where the plaintiff challenges the jurisdictional amount appears to be
'54
open in this circuit."
In cases where no amount of damages have been pled, the Second Circuit relies on either the "value of the object that is the subject matter of
the action" 55 or the "plaintiff's viewpoint test" 56 to determine the amount
in controversy. Like the conflation of the "preponderance of the evidence" and "reasonable probability" standards, the practical difference
between these tests for determining the amount in controversy has not
been readily articulated.
Regardless of which terms the courts use to describe the standard of
proof required, or to determine the amount in controversy, the practical
reality is that the defendant must provide "competent proof" to justify its
allegations that the amount in controversy has been met. In addition to
any amount demanded on the face of the complaint, this proof may include demand letters, 57 deposition testimony, 58 or affidavits describing
the compliance costs associated with injunctive relief. 59 The amount of
51. Ball v. Hershey Foods Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn. 1993).
52. See Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000); Pollock v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Freeman v. Great
Lakes Energy Partners, L.L.C., 144 F. Supp. 2d 201, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
53. See United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v.
Centermark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994) (After stating that
the "reasonable probability" standard applies, the court goes on to state that "the party
asserting jurisdiction must support those facts with 'competent proof' and 'justify [its] allegations by a preponderance of evidence."'); Ins. Co. of the State of Pa. v. Waterfield, 371
F. Supp. 2d 146, 148-49 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing both the "reasonable probability" and
"preponderance of the evidence" standards); Royal Ins. Co. v. Jones, 76 F. Supp. 2d 202,
204 (D. Conn. 1999).
54. CHEUNG V. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(employing the preponderance of the evidence standard and denying the motion to
remand).
55. Id. (quoting 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATIERS § 3708 (3d ed. 1998)).

56. Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972); Leslie v. BancTec Serv.
Corp.,
57.
58.
59.

928 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Royal Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
Ball v. Hershey Foods Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn. 1993).
See, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 30 F.3d at 305-06.
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statutorily available attorneys' fees may be considered if they are sufficiently likely to be awarded and are sufficiently definite. 60 Likewise,
courts may also consider the possible award of punitive damages if "per'6 1
mitted under the controlling law."
Much like the First Circuit, the end result of these vague and ill-defined
standards is a great deal of uncertainty about whether a removal petition
is likely to meet the amount in controversy standard. What is clear is that
a plaintiff's best opportunity to avoid removal is to plead a specific
amount below the amount in controversy. Although courts have recognized that the subsequent ability to amend means that this "does not reliably limit the extent of the defendant's exposure," the plaintiff's demand
is presumed to be made in good faith.62 It is equally clear that this uncertainty gives defendants an incentive to attempt removal of most cases
where complete diversity exists. Regardless of the factual amount in controversy, there is some chance that a combination of inflated plaintiffs'
demands, exaggerated deposition testimony, and potential attorneys' fees
or punitive damages awards may result in the defendant securing its preferred jurisdiction while delaying the proceedings in the process.
D.

THIRD CIRCUIT

The Third Circuit has displayed a keen awareness of the inconsistencies
plaguing amount in controversy disputes, but only time will tell whether
its recently adopted solution will provide the clarity needed to move litigants toward desirable behavior.
In 2000, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania opined that "[c]ourts in
the Third Circuit are unencumbered by consistency in their characterization of defendant[s'] burden of proving the amount in controversy on a
motion to remand. ' 63 The court went on to cite cases utilizing three different standards: "legal certainty," "preponderance of the evidence," and
"reasonable probability," to determine the defendant's burden in amount
in controversy litigation. 64 In the same year, a District of New Jersey
opinion completed a very thorough analysis of the problem which recognized both the external circuit split and the Third Circuit's own internal
65
disagreement on how amount in controversy issues should be handled.
The court concluded that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
was appropriate. 66 The internal disagreement was recognized again in
2003 when the District of New Jersey again opted for the "preponderance
67
of the evidence" standard.
60. See Freeman v. Great Lakes Energy Partners, L.L.C., 144 F. Supp. 2d 201, 208-09
(W.D.N.Y. 2001).

61. A.F.A. Tours, Inc. v. Whitchurch, 937 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1991).

62. Cheung v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
63. Irving v. Allstate Indem. Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 653, 654 (E.D. Pa. 2000).

64. Id.
65. Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562 (D.N.J. 2000).

66. Id.
67. Buchanan v. Lott, 255 F. Supp. 2d 326, 331 (D.N.J. 2003).
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The Third Circuit attempted to clarify the issue in 2004 in Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors of America, Inc. by creating a two-tiered test that examined factual disputes with the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard while adopting the Red Cab "legal certainty" standard once factual disputes were settled. 68 In adopting the "legal certainty" standard,
however, the Samuel-Bassett court failed to address the different procedural posture that existed in Red Cab. In Red Cab, the defendant was
challenging the plaintiff's assertion that the amount in controversy was
met, but in Samuel-Bassett the roles were reversed. 6 9 The Samuel-Bassett
court held that while this could lead to the parties taking strange positions, the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000.70
The district courts did not embrace this standard. Highlighting the difference in procedural posture between Red Cab and Samuel-Bassett, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that defendants were not, in fact,
required to prove the jurisdictional amount to a legal certainty but instead read Samuel-Bassett to require an "inverted legal certainty" test in
which the plaintiffs had to show with legal certainty that they could not
recover more than $75,000.71
It is unlikely that the Third Circuit had intended this inversion of the
legal certainty standard in all situations, and it has since tried to clarify its
position with a pair of cases that dealt with two different removal situations. In Morgan v. Gay,72 the court addressed a situation in which the
plaintiff affirmatively claimed damages less than the jurisdictional minimum, while in Frederico v. Home Depot73 the court considered cases in
which no specific damages claims were made. In Morgan the court held
that the "legal certainty" standard applied, and the case was remanded
because the defendant could not meet that burden.74 While the court
recognized that plaintiffs are the master of their own claims and have the
right to limit their recoveries to avoid federal jurisdiction, it also noted
that state law pleading rules (see further discussion infra) essentially neutralize any binding effect that a specific demand for damages might
have. 75 The court suggested that recoveries in excess of the specific demand might be subject to judicial estoppel, although questions of whether
76
this solution would be effectively utilized are far from resolved.
In Frederico,where the plaintiff did not affirmatively limit her damages
to less than the jurisdictional minimum, the Third Circuit interpreted Samuel-Bassett in much the same way as the Eastern District of Penn68. Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2004).
69. See id. at 395, 397.

70. Id. at 398.
71. See Valley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-5 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
72. See Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 469-71 (3rd Cir. 2006).

73.
74.
75.
76.

Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007).
Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477 & n.9.
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sylvania and affirmed the "inverted legal certainty" standard. 77 Because
the court's review of the pleadings did not show to a legal certainty that
the plaintiff could not recover the jurisdictional amount, the motion for
78
remand was denied.
Morgan and Frederico establish the two standards that govern the
Third Circuit in amount in controversy disputes. But Frederico is also
important for what it indicates about the behavior of the parties. The
plaintiff reacted to the uncertainty surrounding amount in controversy
issues by behaving exactly as expected, by acting vaguely and withholding
information concerning the value of her claim. As the court noted,
"Frederico's response to the Court's query regarding jurisdiction supplies
us with no useful information with which to calculate the amount in controversy. She is playing her cards close to the vest: Her answer neither
'79
agrees with the facts alleged in the removal notice nor contests them.
Likewise, in the face of such uncertainty defendants were encouraged to
remove, and the establishment of the "inverted legal certainty" standard
will certainly increase defendants' motivation to remove any cases falling
into this category.
The twin standards established by Morgan and Frederico have created
a situation in which removal is practically impossible if the plaintiff specifies that her damages are below the jurisdictional minimum and where
removal is virtually certain to succeed if the plaintiff has not made a specific damages pleading. This will either result in an increase in the number of cases where lower damages are specifically pled or in the
continued increase in the number of removals. If the former occurs, the
question of whether judicial estoppel will effectively prevent awards in
excess of the specific amount demanded will be severely tested.
E. FOURTH CIRCUIT
Although there are numerous cases involving amount in controversy
disputes in its district courts, the Fourth Circuit has so far declined to
adopt a particular standard defining the defendant's burden in these matters.80 At the district court level some districts have achieved a consensus
on the standard that will be applied within that district, but others have
avoided squarely addressing the question.
Among those that have settled on a standard are the District of Maryland, the Middle District of North Carolina and the Southern District of
West Virginia. The District of Maryland follows a two-tiered approach in
which the "legal certainty" standard is applied where plaintiffs have specifically pled damages below the jurisdictional minimum and the "pre77. See Frederico,507 F.3d at 197.
78. Id. at 199.
79. Id. at 198.
80. See, e.g., Rota v. Consolidation Coal Co., 175 F.3d 1016 (4th Cir. 1999) (declining
to adopt a standard); Gallagher v. Fed. Signal Corp., 524 F. Supp. 2d 724, 726 n.2 (D. Md.
2007) (stating that the Fourth Circuit has not articulated the standard to be applied).
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ponderance of the evidence" standard is used when no specific damage
amount has been claimed.81 The reasoning behind these decisions is that
the plaintiff's choice of forum is to be respected. 82 When the plaintiff has
made her choice clear by pleading a specific amount, the burden on the
defendant to challenge the choice should be higher. 83 The Middle District of North Carolina employs the "preponderance of the evidence".
standard in all matters, regardless of whether the plaintiff has specifically
84
claimed damages less than the jurisdictional amount.
The Southern District of West Virginia also eventually arrived at the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard, but only after a much longer
period of uncertainty. In a pair of cases from 1994, the court described
the "legal certainty" standard only to then discuss the defendant's burden
with regard to "reasonable certainty. '85 After applying the courts' "common sense" to the allegations they found that a "realistic assessment of
the record" established the jurisdictional amount. 86 This approach was
very different from other "legal certainty" analyses which called into
question the actual standard adopted by the court. Not only was it unclear whether these cases actually followed the "legal certainty" standard
that they adopted, but it also became unclear whether the Southern District had actually adopted a specific standard at all. In Sayre v. Potts, the
court complained that "[in the Southern District of West Virginia, a difference of opinion exists among the various judges over the appropriate
standard in such cases" stating that "legal certainty," "preponderance of
the evidence," and "reverse legal certainty" had all appeared in opinions
within the past five years. 87 In its dismay about the state of the law within
the district, the Sayre court overlooked an opinion which followed yet
another standard, the "clear and convincing" standard utilized in Watterson v. GMRI, Inc.8 8 Since Sayre, in which the court followed the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 8 9 the Southern District of West
Virginia appears to have settled on the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. 90
81. See, e.g., Gallagher, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 726-27; Delph v. Allstate Home Mortg.,
Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 852, 854 (D. Md. 2007); Momin v. Maggiemoo's Int'l, L.L.C., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 506, 509-10 (D. Md. 2002).
82. Momin, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Dash v. FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1996-2, 248 F. Supp. 2d 489,
498 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Bartnikowski v. NVR, Inc., No. 1:07CV00768, 2008 WL 2512839, at
*2 (M.D.N.C. June 19, 2008) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to a
CAFA case).
85. White v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 861 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.W. Va. 1994); Mullins
v. Harry's Mobile Homes, 861 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
86. White, 861 F. Supp. at 24-25, 27-28.
87. Sayre v. Potts, 32 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (S.D.W. Va. 1999).
88. See Watterson v. GMRI, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849-50 (S.D.W. Va. 1997) (arriving at the "clear and convincing" standard after rejecting the "legal certainty," "preponderance of the evidence," and "reasonable probability" standards).
89. Sayre, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Booth, No. 2:07-cv-00553, 2007 WL 2963776, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
Oct. 9, 2007) (following the preponderance of the evidence standard); McCoy v. Erie Ins.
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Unlike the districts listed above, the District of South Carolina has
avoided squarely addressing the question of which burden removing defendants should be required to meet. While an examination of the cases
demonstrates a two-tiered approach somewhat similar to that of the District of Maryland, the courts in this district have not articulated the standard as clearly. For cases in which the plaintiff's claim is lower than the
jurisdictional minimum, the courts have clearly rejected the "inverse legal
certainty" standard because it improperly shifts the burden of proving
federal jurisdiction onto the plaintiff, but they have not formally adopted
any of the other standards. 91 This failure to formally adopt a test is somewhat misleading however, because in practice the courts have refused to
look beyond a plaintiff's assertion that the amount in controversy is below the jurisdictional minimum, thus creating a de facto legal certainty
test (or arguably an even stronger deference to the plaintiff's choice of
forum). 92 Meanwhile, in cases where no specific amount has been
93
claimed the "inverse legal certainty test" has been employed.
The Fourth Circuit is a microcosm of the rest of the nation with regard
to the amount in controversy problem. The various districts of the Fourth
Circuit have experimented with numerous different standards; there is
some cross-district discussion on how best to handle this issue, but ultimately each district has taken its own approach. Some have arrived at a
settled standard while others still remain divided on how this issue is best
decided.
F.

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Since the 1988 amendment that created the one-year bar, the Fifth Circuit has consistently handled more diversity removal cases than any other
circuit. 94 Not surprisingly, it produced one of the earliest comprehensive
Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486-89 (S.D.W. Va. 2001) (analyzing the various standards and
following the Sayre court's selection of the preponderance of the evidence); Green v. Metal
Sales Mfg. Corp., 394 F. Supp. 2d 864, 866-67 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (following the preponderance of the evidence standard).
91. See, e.g., Spann v. Style Crest Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607-08 (D.S.C.
2001).
92. See, e.g., Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (D.S.C.
2008) (following the reasoning of Phillips); Cook v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc.,
No. 9:06-cv-01995-RBH, 2006 WL 2171130, at *3 (D.S.C. Jul 31, 2006) (finding remand
proper where complaint specifically "limits recoverable damages to below the jurisdictional minimum"); Phillips v. Whirlpool Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461-62 (D.S.C. 2005)
(noting that courts "lean toward" requiring legal certainty or reasonable probability, but
that analysis is unnecessary because plaintiff's claim for less than the jurisdictional amount
will not be second guessed by the court).
93. See, e.g., Chavis v. Fidelity Warranty Servs., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 (D.S.C.
2006); Woodward v. Newcourt Commercial Fin. Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 530, 531 & n.2
(D.S.C. 1999).
94. See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-2000, ICPSR Study No. 8429
(Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 2005); Federal Court Cases:
Integrated Data Base, 2007, ICPSR Study No. 22300 (Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research 2008) (noting that the annual average number of diversity removal cases terminated in the Fifth Circuit from 1990-2007 was 3,895 while the next highest
average, the Ninth Circuit, for the same period was 2,338).
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analyses of the amount in controversy problem in De Aguilar v. Boeing,95
as well as a detailed and innovative96 proposal for dealing with forum manipulation in the removal context.
The De Aguilarcase, which involved lawsuits against an aircraft manufacturer arising from an air crash in Mexico, came before the Fifth Circuit
twice: in 1993 and again in 1995. 97 A central issue in both cases was
whether the jurisdictional minimum for federal diversity jurisdiction had
been met. In the 1993 case the plaintiffs had not pled a specific amount
of damages, and the court held that in those circumstances, the defendants had to show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the jurisdictional minimum was met. 98 In 1995 the case returned. This time the
plaintiffs' had specifically stated that their damages did not exceed the
jurisdictional amount.9 9 After considering both the "legal certainty"
standard and the much more relaxed "some possibility" standard applied
by the district court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard was appropriate for this situation as well. 100
The opinion also stated that, once defendants met their burden, plaintiffs
could still secure a 'remand by meeting the Red Cab "legal certainty"
standard (see descriptions supra of the "inverted legal certainty"
standard). 10 1
Thus, the De Aguilar court employed the same standard for cases in
which damages are unspecified and cases in which the plaintiff has affirmatively claimed less than the jurisdictional minimum. It justified this outcome by noting that state court pleading rules seldom bind plaintiffs to
their initial ad damnum amounts, and Texas prohibits specific damages
claims altogether.1 0 2 It therefore declined to place a higher burden on
defendants based on such non-binding state court pleadings, because to
do so would invite manipulation. 10 3 This is particularly true when the
complaint makes it "facially apparent" that the amount in controversy
10 4
requirement has been met.
This standard has remained largely unchanged at both the circuit and
district court level. 10 5 The most common dispute that continues to arise is
95. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55,57-58 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter De Aguilar
I]; De Aguilar v. Boeing, 47 F.3d 1404, 1409-13 (5th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter De Aguilar II].
96. See generally Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying an "equitable exception in the form of estoppel").
97. De Aguilar 1, 11 F.3d at 55; De Aguilar 11, 47 F.3d at 1404.
98. De Aguilar 1, 11 F.3d at 58.
99. De Aguilar H, 47 F.3d at 1409-10.
100. Id. at 1411-12.
101. Id. at 1412.
102. Id. at 1410-11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1413.
105. See, e.g., Myers v. Gregory, No. 07-2213, 2008 WL 239570, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 29,
2008); Felton v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 2003); Gebbia v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 882-83 (5th Cir. 2000); Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193
F.3d 848, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1999); Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.
1999); City of Sachse v. Kansas City S., 564 F. Supp. 2d 649, 657 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Garcia v.
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whether it is "facially apparent" that the complaint seeks more than the
jurisdictional amount. This determination is legally significant because
plaintiff's post-removal stipulations may not prevent removal if the court
determines that it was "facially apparent" from the complaint that the
amount in controversy was met. 10 6 Predictably, the line defining "facially
apparent" is not an easy one to draw.10 7 As a result, in spite of the clarity
and consistency within the Fifth Circuit on the standard to be applied, the
ultimate question of whether a given case exceeds the jurisdictional minimum remains a difficult one to answer.
The Fifth Circuit has also attempted to fashion a judicial solution to the
forum manipulation problem. In 2003, it became the first circuit to hold
that the one-year bar of § 1446(b) could be subject to equitable exceptions.108 In Tedford, the Fifth Circuit held that "[w]here a plaintiff has
attempted to manipulate the statutory rules for determining federal removal jurisdiction, thereby preventing the defendant from exercising its
rights, equity may require that the one-year limit in § 1446(b) be extended." 10 9 Although the plaintiff's manipulation in Tedford involved the
repeated joinder of non-diverse defendants that the plaintiff had no intention of pursuing rather than amount in controversy manipulation,' 10
the holding left open its application to amount in controversy disputes.
While this standard has met with limited acceptance by district courts
both within the Fifth Circuit and beyond, no other circuit court has embraced its use.111
G.

SIXTH CIRCUIT

The Sixth Circuit is in general agreement on the standards applied to
amount in controversy disputes. The clearest cases are those in which the
complaint demands more than the jurisdictional minimum. To oppose
removal in these cases, the plaintiff must show to a "legal certainty" that
12
the amount in controversy does not, in fact, exceed that minimum.'
Much more commonly encountered are cases where the amount of damages are unspecified. This is due, in part, to state law pleading rules in
states such as Kentucky which prohibit including specific damage
Koch Oil Co. of Texas, 351 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2003); Owens v. David, 2007 WL

3243850, at *2-3 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 31, 2007).
106. See Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883.
107. Compare Simon, 193 F.3d at 850-51 (shoulder injury, abrasions and bruises plus
loss of consortium insufficient to meet "facially apparent" requirement), with Luckett, 171
F.3d at 298 (loss of luggage containing plaintiff's heart medication resulting in six-day hospitalization sufficient to meet "facially apparent" standard), and Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883
(injuries to wrist, knee, patella, and back sufficient to meet "facially apparent" standard).
108. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2003).
109. Id. at 428-29.
110. Id. at 428.
111. See, e.g., Foster v. Landon, No. Civ. A. 04-2645, 2004 WL 2496216, at *2 (E.D. La.
Nov. 4, 2004) (acknowledging equitable exception but finding insufficient evidence of manipulation to apply it); Wise v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., No. Civ. JFM-02-2323, 2002
WL 2001529, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2002) (denying remand on equitable grounds).
112. See, e.g., Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993).
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amounts in the complaint. 113 In these cases, the Sixth Circuit generally
imposes the "preponderance 4of the evidence" or "more likely than not"
11
standard on the defendant.
Where the complaint specifically demands less than the jurisdictional
minimum, a somewhat heightened "substantial likelihood" or "reasonable probability" standard is employed.1 1 5 The Sixth Circuit chose not to
place the higher "legal certainty" burden on the defendant because it recognized that in most states within the circuit, the plaintiff's ultimate recovery is not limited by the initial complaint.1 1 6 As a result, defendants
are able to challenge plaintiffs' claims that the amount in controversy is
below the jurisdictional minimum, and often succeed in removing such
cases over plaintiffs' objections, even when the plaintiff has stipulated
that the amount sought does not meet the jurisdictional minimum. 11 7 The
Sixth Circuit displays some division on questions concerning stipulations
and their effectiveness.
The Rogers court held that a plaintiff's post-removal stipulation that
the amount in controversy would not exceed the jurisdictional minimum
was not by itself sufficient to require remand.1 1 8 This decision was based
on the rule articulated in Red Cab that "[e]vents occurring subsequent to
the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the
statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction." 119 While noting that numerous
district courts around the country had remanded in response to binding
stipulations, the Rogers court found it immaterial that a stipulation was
binding, and it refused to remand solely because such a stipulation had
been made.1 20 Since then other district courts in the circuit have been
less categorical in their refusal to credit binding stipulations, characterizing these agreements as "clarifications" of the amount in controversy
1 21
when the complaint demanded unspecified damages.
While this disagreement is relatively minor compared to the divisions
in many of the other circuits, the overall approach is one that still injects a
good deal of uncertainty into the process. The fact that even cases where
113. Egan v. Premier Scales & Sys., 237 F. Supp. 2d 774, 777 (W.D. Ky. 2002). A more
complete discussion of state law pleading requirements and their role in amount in controversy disputes can be found in the next Section.
114. See, e.g., Gafford, 997 F.2d at 158; Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868,
871 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 953.
115. See, e.g., Alinsub v. T-Mobile, 414 F. Supp. 2d 825, 828 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Gafford, 997 F.2d
at 157-58.
116. See, e.g., Rogers, 230 F.3d at 871; Gafford, 927 F.2d at 158.
117. See, e.g., Rogers, 230 F.3d at 871; Egan, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 777-78.
118. Rogers, 230 F.3d at 872-73.
119. Id. (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab, 303 U.S. 283, 290 (1938)).
120. Id. at 872-73.
121. See, e.g., Sparks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-151-R, 2007 WL 101850, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 10, 2007) (granting remand based upon plaintiff's "clarification" of
amount in controversy); Egan, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (finding that lack of unequivocal
stipulation limiting recovery prevented remand); Fenger v. Idexx Labs., Inc., 194 F. Supp.
2d 601, 604 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (giving weight to plaintiff's stipulation in granting motion to
remand).
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the plaintiff specifically demands less than the jurisdictional minimum
may be removed, coupled with uncertainty about the effectiveness of
plaintiff's stipulations concerning the amount in controversy, provides defendants with an incentive to remove any diverse case regardless of its
size.
H.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Until recently the Seventh Circuit utilized a combination of the "reasonable probability" and "inverted legal certainty" standards. 122 Once
defendants met their "reasonable probability" burden, plaintiffs could
still avoid federal jurisdiction by showing that it was a legal certainty that
the amount in controversy did not exceed the jurisdictional minimum.
However, Meridian Security Insurance Co. v. Sadowski, decided by Judge
Easterbrook in mid-2006, squarely addressed the problems associated
with amount in controversy disputes and sharply criticized the vague, meandering, and inconsistent jurisprudence that resulted from the use of the
"reasonable probability" standard. 123 He traced the origin of that standard to a restatement of the "preponderance of the evidence" norm and
complained that since then "[t]he phrase has acquired a life of its own" to
the detriment of legal clarity and consistency. 12 4 He concluded this criticism by establishing "preponderance of the evidence" as the standard in
the Seventh Circuit while "banish[ing] from our lexicon" the phrase
"[r]easonable probability that jurisdiction exists."'1 25 He also reaffirmed
that plaintiffs might still win a motion to remand if they met the "inverted
126
legal certainty" standard.
Such clarity has proven helpful to district courts in the Seventh Circuit
dealing with such issues (they have cited Meridian's discussion of amount
in controversy issues over one hundred times in roughly two years) 127 and
has helped to discourage the twin problems of forum manipulation by
plaintiffs and removal of cases that fall below the jurisdictional minimum
by defendants.
Two recent cases from the Southern District of Illinois are illustrative.
The first, Wienstroer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., found that "the phrase 'in a
sum in excess of FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000) and under
122. See, e.g., Rising-Moore v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 435 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2006);
Smith v. Am. Gen. Life and Acc. Ins. Co., Inc., 337 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2003); Chase v.
Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997); Shaw v. Dow
Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (interpreting McNutt to require a
reasonable probability test).
123. See Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2006).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 543.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Lawrence Crawford Ass'n for Exceptional Citizens, Inc. v. Conversource,
Inc., No. 4:04-cv-4120-DGW, 2008 WL 2557461, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2008); Reason v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-3292, 2008 WL 410227, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2008); Epstein
v. Target Corp., No. 06 C 7035, 2007 WL 551552, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2007); Shadday v.
Rodriguez Mahuad, No. 4:06-CV-0088-JDT-WGH, 2006 WL 2228958, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 2, 2006).
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SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000)' in the state court
complaint [did] not preclude removal" where plaintiff's answers to interrogatories stated that she had over $104,000 in medical bills. 128 In the
second case, Lawrence Crawford Association for .Exceptional Citizens,
Inc. v. Centersource,Inc., the plaintiff's initial pleading exceeded $75,000,
but an error in calculating damages made it clear that damages could not
exceed $67,547.129 The court appropriately found defendant's arguments
that the plaintiff's complaint should control unavailing and remanded the
case because it did not (and could not) meet the jurisdictional
30
minimum.'
While the "preponderance of the evidence" standard itself is quite
common, the Seventh Circuit's approach in Meridian has improved the
clarity and uniformity with which amount in controversy disputes are
handled. The detailed and focused discussion on the practical meaning of
the term and the underlying policies that it was designed to promote has
been generally well received and carefully followed by the district courts.
I.

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Like the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit also follows the "preponderance of the evidence" standard while allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to meet the "inverted legal certainty" standard once the defendant's
burden has been met. 131 However, its gloss on "preponderance of the
evidence" underscores Judge Easterbrook's concern that any legal phrase
may take on "a life of its own" when additional words or phrases become
attached to it.132
The 2005 Kramper opinion stated that a removing party must "show by
a preponderance of the evidence the claims originally asserted by [plaintiff] could, that is might, legally satisfy the amount in controversy requirement."'1 33 This somewhat awkward (and potentially unfortunate)
phraseology was used to emphasize the fact that the amount in controversy is not defined by the ultimate jury award, but rather what a rational
jury could have awarded without being struck as legally excessive. 34 It is
easy to imagine how a restatement of the standard, indicating that the
defendant's burden can be met with a showing that a plaintiff's claim
"could, that is might, legally satisfy" the jurisdictional minimum, could
lead to confusion at the district court level. Fortunately, until now, there
128. Wienstroer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-CV-0457-MJR-DGW, 2008 WL
2782842, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2008).
129. See Lawrence Crawford, 2008 WL 2557461, at *2-3 & n.1.
130. See id. at *5.
131. See James Neff Kramper Family Farm P'ship v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th
Cir. 2005); Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2002).
132. James Neff Kramper Family Farm P'ship, 393 F.3d at 835; see also Meridian Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006).
133. Kramper, 393 F.3d at 831.
134. Id. at 833 (quoting Kopp, 280 F.3d at 885).

2009]

Comedy or Tragedy

have been very few citations to this specific passage 135 and no indication
that a "could, that is might" standard is being employed at the district
136
court level.
The district courts of the Eighth Circuit have also clarified two other
areas of amount in controversy litigation. Without challenging the broad
use of the "preponderance of the evid6nce" standard, they have generally
agreed that the "legal certainty" test applies where plaintiff's complaint
137
specifically states an amount lower than the jurisdictional minimum.
Also, much like the district courts of the Sixth Circuit, several district
courts have permitted plaintiff's post-petition stipulations limiting their
damages as "clarifications" of the amount in controversy. 13
J.

NINTH CIRCUIT

The Ninth Circuit has clearly established rules for how all types of
amount in controversy disputes should be handled. There are three different standards that are used depending upon the amount claimed in the
plaintiff's complaint. In cases where a specific amount of damages have
not been pled, the "removing defendant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been
met."'1 39 Where the complaint alleges damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, the "inverted legal certainty" standard is applied, allowing the plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction if it can be shown to a
legal certainty that the claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional
minimum. 4 0 When the complaint specifies damages that are less than
the jurisdictional amount then the defendant must satisfy the "legal cer14 1
tainty" standard in order to support removal.
The first two standards are well established. The third, however, requiring the use of the "legal certainty" standard when plaintiff claims less
than the jurisdictional amount, was only announced in 2007 by the
Lowdermilk case and has since been questioned in a concurrence by
Judge O'Scannlain.142 Judge O'Scannlain favors the use of a uniform
135. See generally Westhoff v. Rebashares Dev. Co., No. 4:07CV86 HEA, 2007 WL

1395458, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 9, 2007) (finding the amount in controversy of $34,087.31
clearly below the jurisdictional minimum); Questar Data Sys., Inc. v. Serv. Management
Group, Inc., No. 06-0471, 2006 WL 1662961, at *1 (D. Minn. June 14, 2006).

136. Cf Questar, 2006 WL 1662961, at *3.
137. See Kaufman v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1063 (D. Minn.
2008); Nagel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 981, 983 (D.N.D. 2004); Dyrda v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (D. Minn. 1999).
138. See, e.g., Yarovinski v. Heartland Exp. Inc. of Iowa, No. 4:OSCV1953 DDN, 2006
WL 146222, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2006); Agre v. Rain & Hail LLC, 196 F. Supp. 2d
905, 908 (D. Minn. 2002); Dyrda, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
139. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676. 683 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Abrego,
443 F.3d at 683).
140. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998 (citing Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683 n.8).
141. See id. at 999.
142. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2007)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
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"preponderance of the evidence" standard, citing the potential for plaintiffs to manipulate their pleadings to avoid federal jurisdiction and the
inconsistencies caused by the vagaries of state law pleading requirements. 143 Although district courts in the Ninth Circuit have not commented on O'Scannlain's concurrence yet, other courts have noted it in
their discussions of the benefits and detriments of the "legal certainty"
standard. 144
K.

TENTH CIRCUIT

Tenth Circuit jurisprudence on amount in controversy issues can best
be described as vague and hypertechnical. In Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.,
the court required that the amount in controversy be "affirmatively established" on the face of the complaint or the removal petition and remanded when the defendant's removal notice failed to specifically allege
that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied. 145 It did so in
spite of the fact that defendant's subsequent jurisdictional brief provided
factual support for that contention.' 46 The Laughlin court also failed to
offer any guidance on the appropriate standard required to "affirmatively
147
establish" that the amount in controversy requirement was met.
Shortly after Laughlin, the Tenth Circuit quoted the Red Cab "legal
certainty" standard but then employed it in the removal context, essentially inverting it, making it necessary for the plaintiff to show, or the
court to find, to a legal certainty that the plaintiff could not recover the
minimum amount. 148 Three years later it employed the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard while in dicta implying a willingness to consider
a more stringent test for defendants. 149 Yet after signaling this willingness to require more of defendants, the Tenth Circuit instead reaffirmed
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in McPhail v. Deere & Co.
when it adopted Judge Easterbrook's Meridian framework (described
150
supra).
Meanwhile, district courts within the Tenth Circuit, seemingly anticipating the movement toward placing a higher burden on defendants, have
already held that removing defendants must meet a higher burden, at
least in cases where the plaintiff has expressly pled damages less than the
143. Id. at 703-04.
144. See Raspa v. Home Depot, 533 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (D.N.J. 2007); Faltaous v.
Johnson and Johnson, No. 07-1572, 2007 WL 3256833, at *3 n.3 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2007).
145. Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that
treble damages plus reasonably available statutory attorneys' fees satisfied the jurisdictional minimum because there was no legal certainty that this amount could not be
recovered).
149. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (requiring "at a minimum that the jurisdictional amount be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence").
150. See McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 953-57 (10th Cir. 2008). See also supra
notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictional amount. 51 The court in Coca-Cola v. South Beach Beverage adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning for utilizing a higher standard.
Although it described the standard as "reasonable certainty," rather than
the "reasonable probability" standard used by the Sixth Circuit, this has
since been regarded as a distinction without a difference. 152 Subsequently the Eatinger court, in the same context, formally used the term
"reasonable probability" in its opinion. 153 More significantly, neither
court discussed the practical difference between "preponderance of the
evidence" and "reasonable probability." As Judge Easterbrook indicated
when banishing the "reasonable probability" standard from the Seventh
Circuit, the distinction between these standards 154
is difficult to articulate
consistently and virtually impossible to measure.
It remains to be seen whether the Tenth Circuit's newly found certainty
on this issue as described in McPhail will influence the district courts.
The lower courts, having anticipated the circuit's move towards a heightened standard for defendants, have now just received clear guidance in
the other direction.
L.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Like many other circuits, the Eleventh utilizes the "legal certainty"
standard when plaintiff's claim is specifically below the jurisdictional minimum. 1 55 It also follows the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
for cases in which the plaintiff's damages are unspecified, 156 although a
recent opinion makes it clear that in practice, this standard probably un57
derstates the burden on removing defendants.
Judge Tjoflat's long and thoughtful opinion in Lowery v. Alabama
Power Co. examined the origin of the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard and its efficacy in the "naked pleading" context. 58 In cases
where there is no evidence concerning the amount in controversy beyond
the bare pleadings, the court recognized that, from a practical standpoint,
the standard actually approaches "legal certainty. 1 59 This is particularly
true when the opinion's prohibition on post-removal discovery is consid151. See Coca-Cola Bottling of Emporia, Inc. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 198 F. Supp. 2d
1280, 1285 (D. Kan. 2002) (remanding for failure to meet "reasonable certainty" standard);
see also Eatinger v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346-47 (D. Kan. 2007)
(denying remand because defendants met reasonable probability standard).
152. Coco-Cola Bottling, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
153. Eatinger, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 n.1.
154. See supra Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2006).
155. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
156. Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (establishing preponderance of the evidence standard for defendant's burden when plaintiff has
not pled a specific amount of damages); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184,
1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing the origins of the preponderance of the evidence standard
and its drawbacks in cases with limited evidence).
157. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1208-11.
158. Id. at 1209.
159. Id. at 1211.
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ered. 160 By reaffirming the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
and prohibiting any form of post-removal discovery on jurisdictional issues, even in the "naked pleading" context, Lowery effectively guaranteed the remand of diversity cases in which the plaintiff has not provided
evidence supporting removal. 16 1 While voicing its dissatisfaction with the
outcome, the court considered itself bound by precedent to "continue
62
forcing this square peg into a round hole."'
It did not take long for the potential manipulation of this standard to
manifest itself. In Siniard v. Ford Motor Co. the plaintiff filed a wrongful
death claim in state court which Ford removed.' 6 3 Because the complaint
did not make any specific claim for damages but merely asked for compensatory and punitive damages resulting from a wrongful death, the
plaintiff moved for remand on the grounds that Ford had not carried its
burden with respect to the amount in controversy. 64 The court
agreed. 165 "When a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages and does not
make a specific demand, therefore, the factual information establishing
the jurisdictional amount must come from the plaintiff. ' 166 Therefore, if
the plaintiff does not provide any information in her complaint, the defendant will be unable to remove, at least until discovery responses have
been received.
This is particularly troubling for defendants in the Eleventh Circuit,
because district courts have held that removal after thirty days may be
untimely if the face of the complaint provides sufficient information for
the defendant to ascertain that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional minimum.' 67 In Bartley v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc., the court held that a complaint stating that the plaintiff
sought over $15,000 for a spider bite that caused a fever, and resulted in
surgery, was sufficient on its face to require the defendant to remove. 168
The Siniard court, on the other hand, held that a wrongful death claim,
without supporting evidence on the amount in controversy, was insuffi1 69
cient on its face and had to be remanded.
It is too soon to tell whether Lowery will result in an increasing number
of pleadings being filed with unspecified damages claims in the Eleventh
Circuit. As discussed below, the vagueness or specificity of plaintiff's
pleadings are only partially a matter of tactical choice. Much of this
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1215-18.
See id.
Id. at 1211.
Siniard v. Ford Motor Co., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2008).

164. Id. at 1278-79.
165. Id. at 1279.
166. Id. at 1278 (quoting Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215).
167. Bartley v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 07-80637-CIV, 2007
WL 2774250, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2007).
168. Id.
169. Compare Siniard, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-78, with De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11
F.3d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was "facially apparent" that a 1993 wrongful
death claim satisfied the amount in controversy of $50,000).
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vagueness and uncertainty is driven by state law pleading requirements.
Whatever the cause of the lack of specificity in plaintiffs' pleadings, defendants in the Eleventh Circuit are currently in the unenviable position
of having to guess at what may, or may not be, considered facially
sufficient.
M.

STATE LAW PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

The inconsistencies caused by the varied application of the many standards described above, both across circuits and within them, are exacerbated by the differences that exist in state law pleading requirements.
While historically many state law pleading requirements were aligned
with the federal jurisdictional minimums, for a variety of reasons many of
these requirements have not changed in concert with the federal statutes. 170 Currently in most states plaintiffs are not required to allege an
amount in controversy that is relevant to federal removal jurisdiction.
Over half of the states either allow or require that a plaintiff plead generally, without alleging a specific amount in controversy. 17 1 Most of the
remaining states require that the pleadings set forth a threshold amount
in controversy based on state jurisdictional requirements that are lower
than $75,000.172 In addition to these general pleading rules, many state
legislatures have enacted statutes expressly forbidding ad damnum
clauses in complaints arising from certain causes of action, including complaints alleging any type of malpractice, 173 medical malpractice specifi170. See Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the JurisdictionalAmount in Controversy Pursuant to State Statutory Limitations on Pleading Damage Claims, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1091, 1092-93 (1996).

171. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai'i, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin either require or allow general pleading. ALA. R. Civ. P. 8(a); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 8(a); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 8(g); DEL.
SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(g); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 9(g); IND. R. TRIAL P. 8(A)(2); ME. R. Civ. P.

8(a); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 13B (LexisNexis 2008); Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Mo.
Sup. CT. R. 55.05; MONT. CODE ANN. Ch. 20, 8(a) (2007); N.J. CT. R. 4:5-2; N.M. DIST. CT.
R. Civ. P. 1-008; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3017 (Consol. 2008); N.D. R. Civ. P. 8(a); PA. R.C.P. 1021;
S.C. R.C.P. 8(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-8(a) (2008); TENN. R. Civ. P. 8:01; VT. R.C.P.

8(a); WASH C.R. 8(a); WIs. STAT. § 802.02(1) (2007). In many of these states special damages must be pled with specificity. ALA. R. Civ. P. 9(g); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 9(h); ARIz. R.
Civ. P. 9(g); DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(g); HAW. R. Civ. P. 9(g); IDAHO R.C.P. 9(g); IND.
R. TRIAL P. 9(g); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. Art. 861 (2008); ME. R. Civ. P. 9(g); Miss.

R.C.P. 9(g); NEB. CT. R. PLEADING Civ. ACTIONS 8(a); N.J. CT. R. 4:5-8(f); N.D. R. Civ. P.
9(g); S.C. R.C.P. 9(g); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-9(g) (2008); TENN. R. Civ. P. 9.07;
UTAH R.C.P. 9(g); VT. R.C.P. 9(g); WASH. C.R. 9(g); W. VA. R.C.P. 9(g).

172. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming only require
that a complaint allege that the state court's jurisdictional minimums are satisfied. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-91 (2008); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b); IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.403(1); Ky. C.R.
8.01(2); MICH. C.R. 2.111(B)(2); MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.01; NEV. R.C.P. 8(a); N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 508:4-c (LexisNexis 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, 8(a) (2008); OHIO Civ. R.
8(A); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2008(A)(2) (2008); TEX. R. Civ. P. 47(b); Wvo. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1).
173. ME. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-4 (2008).
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personal injury; 17 5 and wrongful death. 176 As a result, very few
plaintiffs nationwide are required to definitively address the federal
amount in controversy requirements as part of their initial pleadings.
attempting to
Courts have commented on the difficulty this causes when
177
assess the amount in controversy in removal disputes.
Only a handful of states require plaintiffs to specifically allege an
amount in controversy, and even some of these prohibit specific damages
allegations for personal injury or wrongful death cases. 178 While requirements for specific allegations of the amount in controversy help draw
clearer lines on the issue, these requirements are only effective in
preventing manipulation if the ad damnum represents a cap on damages.
If, as in many jurisdictions, plaintiffs are allowed to recover amounts in
excess of the amount claimed, then these pleading requirements only give
the illusion of certainty.
There are very few states that require specific ad damnum clauses and
place caps on damages. Even among these, Virginia, Maryland and Oregon illustrate how these specific requirements still may fail to yield certainty about the true amount in controversy. 179 Oregon's "cap" allows
for judgments in excess of the pleadings to be awarded subject to a notice
and hearing requirement for defendants. 180 Maryland's "cap" allows the
court to grant discretionary leave to amend the ad damnum clause after
the jury has rendered its verdict. 18 1 Finally, as evidenced by the initial
example at the opening of this Article from Virginia,1 82 a policy allowing
for liberal amendment of pleadings undermines state 183
pleading rules that
require specific ad damnum clauses, even with a cap.
cally; 174

174. See, e.g., Alabama [ALA. CODE § 6-5-483 (LexisNexis 2008)], Alaska [ALASKA

STAT. § 09.55.547 (2008)], Georgia [GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(B) (2008)], Massachusetts [MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60C (LexisNexis 2008)], Utah [UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-

B-3-409 (2008)].
175. See Illinois [735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604 (LexisNexis 2008)], Washington
[WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.360 (LexisNexis 2008)].
176. California [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(b)(2) (Deering 2008)], Hawai'i (HAw.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.3 (LexisNexis 2008)), Indiana [IND. R. TRIAL P. 8(A)(2)], New

York [N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3017(c) (Consol. 2008)], Rhode Island [R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-30(a)
(2008)].
177. See Leslie v. BancTec Serv. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
178. California, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon and Virginia require that specific damage
amounts be pled, although California and Illinois prohibit pleading specific amounts in
personal injury cases. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a)(2) (Deering 2008); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604 (LexisNexis (2008); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-305; OR. R. Civ. P. 18(B);

VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:2(c)(ii). California also prohibits pleading specific dollar amounts in
wrongful. death cases.
179. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3, 3:2(c)(ii); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-305, as interpreted by Hoang v.
Hewitt Ave. Assocs., 936 A.2d 915, 930-31 (Md. Ct. spec. App. 2007); OR. R. Civ. P. 18(B)
for specificity requirements. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:8; OR. R. Civ. P. 67(c) for "cap" rules.
180. Id.
181. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-341(b).
182. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
183. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:8 provides that "[leave to amend shall be liberally granted in
furtherance of the ends of justice."
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The two states whose pleading requirements effectively address
amount in controversy manipulation are Arkansas and Kansas. Kansas
requires that a plaintiff plead a specific amount for claims under $75,000,
and that a plaintiff explicitly state that he is seeking more than $75,000 if
that is the case.' 84 Coupled with Kansas' cap and somewhat more meaningful review of amendments, the Kansas pleading rules appear to put a
real check on amount in controversy manipulation. 185 Likewise, Arkansas has provisions limiting recovery for unliquidated damages to less than
the amount required for federal diversity jurisdiction, unless the demand
indicates that the claim exceeds that amount. 186 Provisions like these reduce the likelihood of amount in controversy manipulation, but they apply in less than five percent of the states and show no meaningful sign of
expansion.
III.

SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT AMOUNT IN
CONTROVERSY MANIPULATION?

It is one thing to demonstrate that the rules governing removal are
being manipulated and that this manipulation is producing inconsistent
results across the circuits. It is quite another to assert that something
needs to be done about it. What makes the manipulation of this rule
different from the manipulation of any other procedural rule which occurs on a daily basis? After all, a significant part of being a good lawyer
is knowing the procedural rules and using them to benefit your client.
What values are threatened or undermined by the inconsistency that currently exists in this area of the law?
The reflexive answer to this question is that consistency or uniformity
in and of itself is an important value that should be pursued. This perspective has a great deal of scholarly support in the context of uniformity
in federal question cases, based on the desire for uniformity in federal
substantive law across the circuits. 187 This goal of uniformity in federal
law is also reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari decisions
88
which continue to place a high value on resolving circuit splits.1
However, critics of this view that uniformity is valuable for its own
sake, would say that efforts made to ensure uniformity are not worth the
costs imposed on the system. The Supreme Court's very limited docket
space ought not be wasted on ensuring uniformity unless the lack thereof
184. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-208(a)(2).
185. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-215.
186. ARK. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2008).
187. See Amanda Frost, (Over)Valuing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REv. 1578. 1581 n.36
(2008) (listing numerous articles and court decisions citing the need for uniformity in federal law).
188. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup.
CT. REV. 403, 414; David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the CertiorariProcess, 85 TEx. L. REV. 947, 981-82 (2007).
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imposes obvious costs on the system. 189 Even when such obvious costs
are imposed on the system, Amanda Frost argues that in many cases the
legislative branch is primarily responsible for the ambiguities that result
in circuit splits and in most cases the legislature is better equipped to deal
with the problem. 190
There are two factors that make this problem more deserving of judicial attention than most. First, there is the nature of the incentives created by the rules, and the predictable conduct of litigants in response to
those incentives. Second, there is the fact that although the legislature is
clearly better positioned to deal with this problem, it shows little inclination for doing so.
All rules are created to achieve a desired result. They do this by identifying the actors whose behavior can provide the desired result and offering them incentives to change their behavior accordingly. In the case of
the one-year bar the stated goal was to "reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court" and to
avoid the "substantial delay and disruption" of proceedings caused by
late removals. 19' While creating the one-year bar certainly will achieve
this narrow goal by preventing the federal courts from entertaining late
removal petitions, let us consider what this. has done to the incentives for
the parties involved.
Defendants now know that their only opportunity for attaining the federal jurisdiction they prefer will be to remove early in the case, even
when the basis for that removal is highly questionable. As a result, defendants now have a strong incentive to immediately remove any case in
which diversity may exist, regardless of the apparent amount in controversy. The vague and inconsistent standards applied in amount in controversy litigation serve only to increase defendants' incentives to seek
federal jurisdiction, because there are very few bright line situations in
which removal will clearly fail.
On the other hand, the one-year bar gives plaintiffs every incentive to
make their damages pleas as vague as possible and to continue to be
vague and non-specific in their early discovery responses regarding the
quantum of damages. The same vague and inconsistent standards that
drive defendants to remove questionable or unworthy cases also encourage plaintiffs to avoid sharing any specific information about their
claims for the first year of litigation to preserve their choice of state court.
These incentives, and the behavior they encourage, appear to have affected federal diversity removal rates.
While it will require a more detailed empirical study to measure how
much of an effect the one-year bar has had on diversity removal rates,
189. See Frost, supra note 187, at 11 (noting that such costs might include great expense
and inconvenience for multi-state actors, incompatible standards of conduct within jurisdictions, or conflicts that pose serious questions for the legitimacy of the system).
190. Id. at 27-28.
191. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032.
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there can be no question that diversity removal rates have gone up considerably since the creation of the one-year bar. From 1990 to 2007 the
total number of civil cases terminated in those years increased 12% while
the number of diversity cases remained almost the same. 192 During the
same time period, removals on diversity grounds increased 56%.193 Even
when three-year averages are used these trends remain. The annual average number of civil cases terminated from 2005 to 2007 was 7.65% higher
than the average from 1990 to 1992.194 During that same time the average number of diversity cases terminated actually declined over 3%, but
the average number of removed diversity cases increased 24.6%.195
It would seem that the one-year bar was a contributing factor in this
increase. As the true meaning of the one-year bar was internalized by
both the plaintiff and the defense bars, predictable results began to occur.
When it became apparent that federal jurisdiction could be avoided
through vagueness, the plaintiffs' bar repeatedly counseled its members
on how to effectively withhold damages information until after the first
year of litigation has passed. 196 Meanwhile the courts, armed largely with
subjective standards for assessing vaguely pled amounts-in-controversy,
inevitably produced opinions in which factually similar claims were found
to fall on either side of the amount in controversy standard. 19 7 These
decisions did nothing to dissuade defendants from removing even obviously non-meritorious cases on the gamblers' chance that an advantage
could be gained from the present uncertainty.
While the judicial inefficiency and fundamental fairness concerns
raised by these events might provide a reason for taking this uniformity
problem more seriously than others, these are not the most pressing reasons for addressing this problem. Rather, it is the nature of removal/remand litigation, and the legitimacy concerns that go along with it, that is
192. Compare Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-2000, ICPSR Study
No. 8429 (Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research 2005), available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/08429.xm., with Federal Court Cases:
Integrated Data Base, 2007, ICPSR Study No. 22300 (Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research 2008), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/
STUDY/22330.xml. There were 213,922 civil cases terminated in the federal courts in 1990
compared with 239,678 terminated in 2007. Of these cases, 57,732 were diversity cases in
1990 while 57,758 were diversity cases in 2007 (an increase of 0.05%).

193. Id. There were 12,392 removed diversity cases that were terminated in 1990. That
number increased to 19,384 in 2007.
194. See supra note 92 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2006, ICPSR Study
No. 4685 (Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research 2007), available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04685.xml; Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2005, ICPSR Study No. 4382 (Inter-University Consortium for Political
& Social Research 2006), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/MACJDI
STUDY/04382.xml. The average number of civil cases terminated from 1990-92 was
242,947. This increased by 7.65% to 261.541 for 2005-07.
195. See supra notes 192 and 194. The annual average number of civil diversity cases
terminated from 1990-92 was 65,229 while that number decreased 3.17% to 63,161 for
2005-07. The annual average number of diversity removal cases terminated from 1990-92
was 15,265 while that number increased by 24.6% to 19,020 for 2005-07.
196. See Breeden and Walker, supra note 29.
197. See supra note 51.
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the greatest cost imposed by the current system. A typical removal/remand dispute involving the amount in controversy turns the entire litigation on its head. The Seventh Circuit has described an oral argument
involving one such motion for remand: "Thus at oral argument we had
the privilege of witnessing a comic scene: plaintiff's personal injury lawyer protests up and down that his client's injuries are as minor and insignificant as can be, while attorneys for the manufacturer paint a sob story
about how plaintiff's life has been wrecked. ' 198 While this radical distortion of the parties' positions may provide comic relief for some judges, it
also clearly illustrates why the current system is unacceptable. Both parties are driven to advocate positions that they do not actually believe and
positions that they will promptly contradict the next time they appear in
either state or federal court. While it may be difficult to quantify the
detrimental effect that this has on the legitimacy of these proceedings, the
fact that such distortions are routine illustrates the need for addressing
this problem.
If the problem must be addressed, why must it be the judicial branch
that addresses it? While there is no question that the most efficient solution for this problem lies in a legislative amendment to § 1446(b), there is
every indication that Congress has no intention of satisfactorily addressing this problem any time soon. 199 Given the legislature's failure to act
and the indication that the most likely action will leave the one-year bar
in place, it falls to the judiciary to use the tools that it possesses to address
such a threat to the legitimacy of the system.
IV. EXISTING PROPOSALS
A. THE ALI

PROPOSAL

In the late 1990's the ALI undertook the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (the "Project") that examined three discrete areas where it
believed that statutes governing federal court civil litigation were not optimal.20 0 One area that the Project addressed was removal. The Project
recognized the complex and interwoven nature of removal statutes and
Sought mainly to clarify, rather than simplify, the rules that define the
boundary between state and federal courts. 20 Its proposed changes to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441-47 mainly focused on codifying well established features
of decisional law and increasing the clarity of existing statutory provisions
198. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993).
199. Interview with John B. Oakley regarding the lack of a legislative reaction to the
ALI's Federal Code Revision Project that has been completed for over four years. Recently the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has circulated its proposed amendment to § 1446(b), discussed in detail infra,
that retains the one-year bar but with the allowance for equitable exceptions to it in cases
of clear manipulation.
200. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION
PROJECT (2004).
201. See id. at 325.
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through extensive reordering and renumbering. 20 2
The Project recognized that the one-year bar "invites contrivance to
frustrate defendants' legitimate rights of removal" and described the oneyear bar as "overbroad and easily abused. 2 0° 3 To address these problems
the Project proposed that the one-year bar be removed from § 1446(b)
which governs removal and inserted new language into § 1447(b) which
governs remand. 20 4 This new section would allow for discretionary remand to state court of diversity cases that were removed more than one
year after the action commenced.20 5 Such remand would only be ordered
20 6
on a party's motion and not through sua sponte action of the court.
While eliminating the one-year bar from § 1446(b) and adding a provision for discretionary equitable remand in § 1447(b) is an effective legislative solution to amount in controversy manipulation, this solution does
not directly translate into decisional law. Because only legislative action
can eliminate the one-year bar, any procedural solution must account for
its continued existence which the ALI proposal, by its nature, does not
do. What the ALT proposal does provide is an outline for a legislative
solution that does not appear to be forthcoming.
B.

THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

The Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed a bill entitled the "Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2008" (the "proposed statute"). 20 7 It proposes a variety of amendments to several sections of title
28 of the U.S. Code, including amendments to the removal procedures
found in § 1446. The accompanying analysis discusses the major
problems identified in this Article: the variety of standards that apply to
amount in controversy litigation, the prevalence of unnecessary and disruptive removals, and the adoption of removal-defeating strategies by
plaintiffs.20 8 Its proposed solutions to these problems, while promising in
some areas, are unlikely to fix the negative incentives for both parties
that have produced the upside-down litigation posturing that is so damaging in this area.
Unlike the ALI proposal, the proposed statute leaves the one-year bar
in place. 20 9 To address the problems identified in its accompanying analysis, the proposed statute takes several steps. It first eliminates the use of
different standards across circuits by establishing the "preponderance of
202. See id. at 326-32.

203. Id. at 466.
204. See id. at 463-69.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 467.
207. Proposed Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2008 (on file
with the author).
208. Section-by-section analysis, Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification
Act of 2008 (on file with author).
209. The second paragraph of the current § 1446(b) is left intact and renumbered in the
proposal as § 1446(b)(3).
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the evidence" standard as the uniform burden for defendants seeking removal. 210 This standard would apply in all cases, except where the initial
pleading sought specific damages below the jurisdictional minimum and
the state practice did not permit recovery of damages in excess of the
amount claimed.2 1 ' In these relatively rare circumstances, the amount
in controsought in the pleading would be considered to be the amount
212
versy, and the defendant would not be able to remove.
The proposed statute limits disruptive removals by retaining both the
one-year bar and the requirement that removals must occur within thirty
days of service upon the defendant, if a case was removable when filed.
It further restricts removal by limiting the ability to remove in close proximity to trial. Where a case was not removable when filed, if a defendant
receives discovery responses or "other paper" indicating for the first time
that a case is removable at trial or within thirty days of trial, a defendant
may only remove if it can be shown that the "plaintiff deliberately failed
to disclose the actual amount in controversy in order to prevent
213
removal."
The proposed statute also attempts to prevent plaintiffs' forum manipulation through the use of an equitable exception. In cases where a defendant does not receive the first indication that a case is removable until
one year after the case is filed, the statute permits the court to grant the
defendant an equitable exception to the one-year bar. 21 4 Such an exception would be allowed upon a showing "that the plaintiff deliberately
failed to 15disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent
2
removal."
While the proposed statute addresses many of the problems created by
the one-year bar, it probably will not remedy the problems that we have
seen displayed. Universally adopting the "preponderance of the evidence" standard will add uniformity to how these problems are approached by the courts, but as this Article has demonstrated, there
remains a meaningful amount of uncertainty around how courts will interpret that standard. The "gamblers' chance" remains for removing defendants that prefer a federal forum, so it is unlikely that the proposed
statute will reduce the number of speculative removals.
Likewise, the equitable exception offered to prevent plaintiffs' forum
manipulation is unlikely to prove effective. If anything, it will encourage
plaintiffs to "hide the ball" even more. Under the proposed statute plaintiffs are not even required to get to the one year mark to defeat removal,
they can now also do so by just getting to within thirty days of trial. If
plaintiffs can avoid sharing definitive information about the magnitude of
their claim until either of these time restrictions have been met, they are
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See proposed § 1446(4)(B).
See proposed § 1446(4)(A)(ii).
See id.
Proposed § 1446(b)(5)(A).
Proposed § 1446(b)(5)(B).
Id.
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then only required to show that the failure to disclose was not "deliberate" or that it was not designed to "prevent removal." Except in particularly egregious cases, like the one described in the introduction, plaintiffs
will argue that legitimate uncertainties about continuing treatment, permanency, emotional losses, or incidental or consequential damages,
among other reasons, prevented them from truly knowing the value of
their claim. Within the Fifth Circuit, which at least nominally recognizes
equitable exceptions in this context, such behavior has already been exhibited.2 16 In Foster v. Landon, the plaintiff explicitly claimed damages
less than $75,000, but after the one year deadline had passed, sent a demand for more than $75,000 along with medical records demonstrating
that the plaintiff had a herniated disc. 2 17 The court held that "though
suspicious, the record in this case does not present the egregious, clear
pattern of forum manipulation" necessary to warrant an equitable
2 18
exception.
Much like with defendants' removals described above, the proposed
statute leaves plaintiffs with a "gamblers' chance," and given the height
of the bar quite a good chance at that, to avoid federal jurisdiction. There
is little reason to believe that they will not continue to avail themselves of
that chance.
C.

TEDFORD V. WARNER-LAMBERT AND EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS

As noted supra, the Fifth Circuit has pioneered the use of equitable
219
exceptions to the one-year bar as a way to combat forum manipulation.
In Tedford v. Warner Lambert Co., the Fifth Circuit referenced the ALl
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, the Project's proposed elimination of the one-year bar, and its creation of equitable remand provisions
for later-removed cases in proposed § 1447(b). 22 0 Tedford appears to be
an attempt at fashioning a temporary judicial fix for the manipulation
problem while awaiting a more decisive and permanent legislative remedy. While arguably a laudable attempt at preventing plaintiffs from benefiting from clear forum manipulation, the Tedford approach suffers from
the fact that the plain language of § 1446(b) does not allow for equitable
exceptions and the legislative history does not contemplate their creation. 22 1 As a result it has not been adopted by any other circuit courts and
has been used sparingly at the district court level.
While Tedford's concept of an equitable exception to § 1446(b) may
carry some potential for remedying amount in controversy manipulation,
even when it functions at its best it still fails to address major problems
216. See Foster v. Landon, No. Civ.A. 04-2645, 2004 WL 2496216, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov.
4, 2004).
217. See id.

218. See id.
219. See supra Fifth Circuit discussion, Section II.G.
220. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 427 n.10 (5th Cir. 2003).
221. See E. Kyle McNew, Are Rules Just Meant to be Broken? The One-Year Two-Step

Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1355-62 (2005).
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inherent in the system. Defendants still have a strong incentive to attempt removal in any situation where the amount in controversy is the
least bit unclear, while plaintiffs have an even stronger incentive to remain vague about the magnitude of their claims. This is because vagueness is less likely to be viewed as manipulation and unlikely to trigger the
2 22
extraordinary remedy of an equitable exception.

D.

SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS

Two noted scholars at Cornell Law School, Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, recently mentioned amount in controversy problems in
their article on the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 223 Although their
main focus was on analyzing CAFA's implementation and shortcomings
and on conducting a statistical analysis of the judiciary's reaction to the
legislation, they devoted several pages to a discussion of the amount in
controversy disputes in non-CAFA cases. 22 4 They concluded this discussion by stating that the "the best approach in general .... is to require
that the removing defendant show to a legal certainty that any recovery
will exceed the jurisdictional amount. '22 5 This echoes the conclusion of a
1997 article that urged the universal adoption of the legal certainty test, at
least in cases in which the amount in controversy was not apparent on the
2 26
face of the complaint.
These suggestions are largely based upon the recognition that the
plaintiff is the master of the claim and that plaintiff's choice of forum
should not be lightly put aside. They also recognize that lower standards,
such as the preponderance of the evidence, will inevitably lead to defendants successfully removing cases that would otherwise not have fallen
under the court's original jurisdiction.2 2 7 Unfortunately, this suggestion
only addresses one side of the problem. It would most assuredly prevent
defendants from removing cases to federal court that do not belong there.
But adopting a universal "legal certainty" test in a legal regime that includes the one-year bar would make removal of an unwilling plaintiff virtually impossible, assuring that many cases which "belong" in federal
court would not end up there.

222. See Foster v. Landon, No. Civ. A. 04-2645, 2004 WL 2496216, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov.
4, 2004).
223. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:A Tale
of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008).
224. See id. at 1569-79.

225. Id. at 1578.
226. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in
Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff's Complaint: The Need for
Judicial and Statutory Reform To Preserve Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts,
62 Mo. L. REV. 681, 754 (1997).
227. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1577.
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V.

UNIFYING PROPOSAL

Any proposal to alter the way federal diversity jurisdiction is regulated
must account for the principles underlying its exercise. The first of these
principles is that plaintiffs are the masters of their claims. 228 Our system
allows plaintiffs to choose among all proper venues and jurisdictions; it
allows them to assert as many or as few claims as they choose and to
eschew available federal claims to ensure their jurisdictional preference. 22 9 It has long been established that the plaintiff's choice of forum
should not lightly be disturbed, and any proposal aimed at addressing the
problems created by the one-year bar must take that into account.
The plaintiffs' interest in choice of forum is balanced against a diverse
defendant's interest in access to federal courts for cases of a certain magnitude. While Congress has indicated that it considers the defendants'
interest to be subordinate to the plaintiffs' choice of forum, there is no
indication that Congress intended to allow clever plaintiffs to eliminate
defendants' access to the federal courts entirely. To create a policy that
properly balances these interests it is critical to acknowledge the realities
of litigation, to understand the distribution of information, and to create
incentives that reward straightforward behavior and penalize "tactical
chicanery" by either side.
The realities of litigation are that both sides are convinced that defendants, in most cases, benefit from federal jurisdiction. As a result, defendants will attempt to remove almost any case between completely diverse
parties regardless of the amount in controversy in the hope that the complaint's lack of specificity, the uncertain treatment of a plaintiff's stipulations, the varying standards for determining the amount in controversy,
the potential for punitive damages, and other issues will be sufficient to
support removal. Conversely, plaintiffs that are completely diverse from
out of state defendants will want to remain in state court without limiting
the upside potential of their claims. To that end they are encouraged to
make their damages pleas as vague as possible and to delay and dissemble in their discovery responses to avoid either limiting their recovery or
providing the necessary information to allow for removal.
At the outset of litigation, plaintiffs have the most information about
their claim's value, but they have very little incentive to carefully consider
the magnitude of their claim. Settlement negotiations are probably
months or even years away, and discovery may always yield additional
bases for damages. If anything, plaintiffs have every incentive to conceal
any information about the magnitude of their claim from both the defendant and the court. Any proposal aimed at altering behavior and eliminating abuse of the procedural rules must give plaintiffs an incentive to
share that information, without improperly impinging upon their choice
of forum. That incentive is time.
228. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
229. See McNew, supra note 221, at 1337 (summarizing statutory and case law authority
that allows the plaintiff great latitude in framing and prosecuting her claim).
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With few exceptions, plaintiffs are interested in a prompt resolution of
their claim while defendants go to great lengths to delay resolution (and
payment) for as long as possible. A primary purpose for the one-year bar
is to prevent defendants from delaying the final reckoning by removing a
case after substantial progress has been made in state court. 230 In cases
where the amount in controversy is an issue, courts should utilize the authority granted them by the remand statute to encourage plaintiffs to
both evaluate their claims and share that information promptly with de23 1
fendants or the court.
Under § 1447(a), "the district court may issue all necessary orders and
process to bring before it all proper parties" as part of any remand decision.232 Whenever courts are faced with a motion to remand on the
grounds that the amount in controversy requirement is not satisfied,
rather than relying on the variety of tests and standards currently utilized,
they should directly question the plaintiff on the matter and then act on
the plaintiff's representation. If a plaintiff asserts that the amount in controversy requirement will not be met, the court should grant the motion
to remand without further inquiry.
This procedure differs from the use of stipulations discussed in section
II.h, because it does not attempt to limit plaintiff's possible recovery at an
early stage in litigation when, in some cases, it will be legitimately difficult to know the true extent of the damages. It also provides a greater
degree of deference for the plaintiff's choice of forum than is currently
provided by any of the currently used standards, including "legal certainty." But these advantages would come at a price to the plaintiff. In
exchange for remanding the case based solely on the plaintiff's non-binding representation, the court would require that the plaintiff waive any
use of the one-year bar to prevent a future removal of the case. If it later
became clear that the amount in controversy is, in fact, greater than the
statutory threshold, the defendant would be allowed to remove again, no
matter how long the case had been pending.
This waiver would not prevent the plaintiff from challenging any subsequent removal, but would merely prevent the use of the one-year bar to
defeat removal. Defendants' right to remove a second time would still be
governed by § 1446(b), which requires removal to be exercised "within
thirty days after receipt ... of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case
is one which is or has become removable. '233 This would prevent the evil
of removal occurring "after substantial progress has been made in state
court" that Congress was concerned with when it enacted § 1446(b), un230. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
6032.
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a). I would like to thank Prof. John B. Oakley for his suggestion that a broad interpretation of the statutory remand provisions might offer the solution
sought.
232. § 1447(a).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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less the plaintiff was responsible for the delay by failing to disclose the
true amount in controversy. 234 It is, after all, well within the plaintiff's
capacity to start the thirty-day clock running at any time by simply and
clearly describing the damages sought. Even in states that prohibit claims
for specific damage amounts, the plaintiff may start the clock by providing notice of the amount in controversy through "other paper" such as a
discovery response or a settlement demand.
This proposal would allow defendants to remove during any part of the
state court process, even during trial. Of course such an extraordinary
event would only occur in reaction to obvious cases of manipulation. If
plaintiff's claim suddenly increased from $50,000 in discovery responses
to $100,000 in opening arguments then removal would be appropriate.
Defendants will not complain about the delay caused by such late removals because they retain the option of remaining in state court, and plaintiffs will have little grounds to complain about a delay that they authored.
When such secondary removals occur, the defendant will have meaningful evidence to support its claim that the jurisdictional minimum is
met, eliminating the "naked pleading" problem discussed in Section II.M,
supra. Because this unifying proposal represents a change in decisional
law, not in the statute, the varying standards that currently exist across
the circuits cannot be unified with one stroke of the pen. While each
circuit will continue to use its current standards, Judge Easterbrook's
thorough opinion in Meridian makes a compelling argument for the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Whatever standard is used, courts
will benefit from a much clearer understanding of what is at stake in the
litigation, and plaintiffs will retain control of when and how that information is provided.
This procedure will provide the proper incentive for all parties where
disputes over the amount in controversy are concerned. It establishes a
uniform approach for dealing with questions of federal jurisdiction that is
not affected by the vagaries of state law pleading rules, while preserving
the plaintiff's legitimate choice of forum. It will discourage defendants
from speculatively removing cases on the gamblers' chance that unclear
"reasonable probability" or "preponderance of the evidence" standards
can be satisfied. 235 Instead, defendants will remove most cases facing the
near certainty of remand. As a result, they are only likely to do so if they
believe that the amount in controversy will ultimately exceed the jurisdictional minimum. This is because it will be difficult to convince clients to
pay for a removal motion, the costs of which are borne almost entirely by
defendants, unless there is some possibility of long-term success. Further,
any misuse of the second removal opportunity to disrupt or delay state
234. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032.
235. See, e.g. King v. Retailers Nat'l Bank, 388 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(holding that plaintiff's claim for $5,000-$15,000 filed in a court whose jurisdictional limit
for compensatory and consequential damages is $30,000, allegedly premised on potential
punitive damage awards and attorneys' fees, is a clear example of improper removal).
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court proceedings can be punished by the imposition of attorneys' fees
236
and costs against the defendant.
It may be argued that this proposal is too friendly toward plaintiffs who
will abuse the initial "remand at will" offered by this proposal to conduct
more settlement negotiations while cases remain in state courts. But that
advantage is limited to cases for which settlement demands are below
$75,000; in other words, it is limited to cases which unquestionably belong
in state court. More importantly this proposal will eliminate any incentive for the plaintiffs to disguise the amount in controversy in larger cases,
the ones which belong in federal court, because such deception will only
result in delay, not in avoidance of the federal forum.

236. See, e.g., Whisenant v. Roach, 868 F. Supp. 177, 178-79 (S.D. W.Va. 1994) (awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs because defendants' removal was "ill-founded").

